The Netherlands feels more and more squeezed within the “extreme competition” between the United States and China, and has reached out to South Korea to mitigate a part of its fallout.
Although they share a number of the identical apprehensions vis-à-vis Xi’s China, neither needs to be dragged into the U.S. struggle to maintain liberal primacy as a totally aligned participant.
In a joint report by the Dutch intelligence providers in late November, dire warnings had been forged about China’s asymmetrical problem. Labeling China because the “biggest threat to Dutch knowledge security,” the report said, “Dutch businesses, knowledge institutions, and scientists are widely targeted by various (digital) attack campaigns attempting to capture high-value technology.”
Ten days earlier than that, nevertheless, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade had issued a daring assertion directed on the United States, saying the Netherlands limits exports of ASML, the world’s chief in lithography methods, to China “on [its] own terms.”
In 2019, after extreme strain from the Trump administration, the Netherlands banned ASML from exporting its excessive ultraviolet (EUV) lithography methods to China. These machines can produce essentially the most superior chips wanted in, for instance, artificial intelligence. EUV gross sales represent half of ASML’s income.
These two competing pressures are a testomony to the predicament the Netherlands finds itself in. The worldwide system is present process profound structural change, particularly impacting the semiconductor subject. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s founder, Morris Chang, not too long ago lamented that globalization and free commerce are “almost dead.”
As is widespread in instances of nice transformation, smaller states are searching for new alignments to offset vulnerabilities past their management. In the rising new chilly warfare, these efforts are all about creating provide traces extra resilient to the whims of geopolitics.
It is on this context that South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte issued a joint assertion on November 17 in Seoul, establishing a strategic partnership.
At the center of the assertion lies the decision for higher cooperation between each nations’ private and non-private sectors to “jointly protect and promote critical and emerging technologies.”
Looking on the timeline, the impetus for elevating bilateral relations is apparent.
The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security issued a one-year licensing waiver in October for Samsung and SK hynix to export chips to China. The two South Korean conglomerates function high-end factories in China that use U.S. chip tools and designs, bringing them beneath the ambit of U.S. export controls. One estimate places the share of Samsung’s chip gross sales revenues which might be earned in China at 25 p.c; for SK hynix, that share is valued at 40 p.c.
Earlier, in September, South Korea was not on board with a U.S.-proposed coordination platform referred to as the “Chips 4 Alliance,” with Japan and Taiwan, out of concern of Chinese retaliation.
Indeed, it’s not in South Korea’s curiosity to disrupt the present optimum ecosystem, one thing that was echoed in November by Dutch NXP and different European mature-node chipmakers. China is a vital hub for the manufacturing of those sorts of semiconductors, that are utilized in automobiles and residential home equipment in addition to for the manufacturing of key components and supplies.
Of course, it was the scarcity of this section of chips in 2020 that led to the rethink of present provide traces within the first place. That mentioned, a full reshoring or “friend-shoring” of manufacturing capability that makes use of bigger, older nodes is not possible economically.
Toward the EU’s quest to acquire “digital sovereignty,” a logical subsequent step within the new Netherlands-South Korea partnership could possibly be a high-end South Korean plant in Brainport Eindhoven.
A tech hub located lower than three miles from ASML, the plant may in trade be given preferential entry to function ASML’s latest EUV methods there. Samsung would be capable of leapfrog the presently most superior 3-nanometer course of and begin with the manufacturing of the most recent 2-nanometer-based chips in Eindhoven. The Netherlands’ $21 billion National Growth Fund may facilitate this initiative.
For each nations, the competitors within the semiconductor sector is fierce. Taiwanese TSMC has already been swayed to construct chip vegetation in southwestern Japan (with the Japanese authorities investing in a 50 p.c stake) and in Arizona. Following the United States’ CHIPS and Science Act, providing huge subsidies, TSMC introduced in December that it’s constructing a second plant there and growing its dedication to $40 billion.
Industrial coverage is again, and it’s entrance and middle in as we speak’s geopolitics. For the Netherlands, which has an open financial system deeply intertwined with German manufacturing, a South Korean plant would go a good distance in mitigating provide uncertainties. Besides the machines that make the chips, South Korea may diversify its export and acquire nearer entry to the EU, the world’s largest single market.
Source web site: thediplomat.com
