South Korea’s Economic Security Dilemma

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, throughout his particular deal with to the World Economic Forum (WEF), acknowledged that the “Republic of Korea, which boasts the world’s top-notch production technologies and manufacturing capabilities in semiconductor, rechargeable batteries, steelmaking, and biotechnology, will be a key partner in the global supply chain.” That declaration furthers Yoon’s imaginative and prescient of South Korea as a “global pivotal state” and dietary supplements Seoul’s not too long ago launched Indo-Pacific Strategy, which is premised on three ideas: inclusiveness, belief, and reciprocity.

The intensification of China-U.S. strategic competitors within the Indo-Pacific is diminishing house for cooperation and rising the chance of confrontation between the 2 powers. As this competitors intensifies, states are more and more discovering their autonomy constrained. Fragmentation of provide chains, commerce protectionism, and the securitization of rising applied sciences, amongst different points, are the first causes of this polarization. South Korea, one of many key powers of the Indo-Pacific, is caught up on this strategic rivalry and has been compelled to rethink its earlier posture of strategic ambiguity. Seoul’s cautious coverage of strategic ambiguity, manifested in a method that rigorously navigates between Washington and Beijing, is now proving to be futile, and geopolitical tensions are incrementally pushing Seoul towards nearer strategic alignment with Washington.

The contest between financial prosperity and safety issues in Seoul’s strategic outlook was a matter of concern even through the Park Geun-hye administration (2013-2017) and have become fairly outstanding throughout Moon Jae-in presidency (2017-2022), when relations with China turned bitter due to the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. But with superior and demanding applied sciences being a brand new strategic disruptor in Seoul’s relations with the United States and China, the rising actuality will make it tough for Seoul to have a coverage of strategic readability in its overseas and commerce coverage.

What was earlier confined to geopolitical contestation is now getting entangled with geoeconomics. Since important applied sciences have emerged as a powerful hyperlink between geopolitics and geoeconomics, resilient provide chains, trusted sources, and entry to uncommon earth supplies have gotten extra important components in shaping Seoul’s long-term strategic outlook. Therefore, Seoul’s Indo-Pacific technique additionally appears to be an endeavor to offer the management sufficient house to pursue selective cooperation with Beijing to keep away from a very adversarial relationship, whereas additionally prioritizing nearer alignment vis-à-vis Washington.

Critical Technologies and Security Considerations 

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“The rivalry for technological hegemony and the weakening of the multilateral trade system has led to the weakening of the global supply chains,” Yoon acknowledged throughout his speech on the WEF, acknowledging the altering nature of strategic alignment, which is premised on worldwide norms, rule of regulation, belief, and provide chain resilience. As states more and more undertake measures to securitize the know-how sector, info and communications know-how, synthetic intelligence, 5G, and 6G are seen as strategic belongings that have to be shielded from infiltration by overseas adversaries.

This pattern of securitizing strategic belongings just isn’t restricted to the United States however is proliferating in South Korea, fueled by the know-how sector’s linkage with nationwide safety issues. Now reliability, belief, and resilience are nationwide safety issues, and never simply aspirational values.

South Korea has additionally tried to realign its technique and posture vis-à-vis rising applied sciences. We can observe an incremental shift from ambiguity to alignment in Seoul’s outlook on important rising applied sciences. This shifting posture may be traced by means of the South Korea-U.S. joint statements through the Moon and Yoon administration: Under Yoon, the emphasis has been placed on working “to prevent the use of advanced technologies to undermine our national and economic security,” transferring a step forward from simply “cooperation” throughout Moon’s administration.

Other key developments that make a case for Seoul’s nearer strategic alignment with Washington are South Korea’s semiconductor corporations relocation of some funding to the United States; Seoul’s intention to affix the strategic CHIP 4 initiative; and South Korea’s participation within the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum (IPEF) and the Washington-led minerals safety partnership.

Similarly, Seoul’s Indo-Pacific Strategy has a separate chapter for strengthening cooperation in important domains of science and know-how, which emphasizes “engaging in collaborative networks with the U.S. while expanding technology cooperation with Europe, Canada and Australia.”

For important and superior applied sciences, Seoul additionally seeks lively participation with the Quad. Seoul’s Indo-Pacific technique has additionally indicated its need to progressively increase avenues of cooperation with the Quad. Meanwhile, China is conspicuously absent as a strategic companion.

Beijing perceived Seoul to be taking a extra non-aligned posture on the rising Sino-U.S. technological competitors below Moon. However, the U.S. has upped the ante since then – and elevated Beijing’s sense of urgency. China has now clearly expressed its opposition to the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Chinese media retailers even warned Seoul that it ought to “independently formulate its own semiconductor industrial strategies,” including that “whether South Korean chipmakers will expand or lose market share in China now depends on South Korea’s industrial policy for its semiconductor sector.”

South Korean commerce is closely dependent on China, its largest buying and selling companion, with semiconductor exports reaching round $42 billion per yr. The frictions may have implications for China-South Korea FTA negotiations within the service and funding sector, elevating the dangers for Seoul.

Economic Considerations and Supply Chain Resilience 

A more in-depth alignment with the U.S. within the know-how area is not going to essentially translate into nearer cooperation in commerce and commerce. Even if this had been to occur, it will both demand structural modifications in the way in which Seoul perceives its relations with Beijing or a possible situation the place Seoul earnings from new markets, which could offset the commerce prices from dependency on China.

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Thus far, South Korea has maintained a balanced commerce relationship with China and has benefited from outsourcing manufacturing. With Seoul’s reducing inhabitants, any probabilities of taking additional financial dangers would discover no unanimous assist in both conservative or progressive events. The want for a bipartisan consensus domestically on easy methods to take care of China vis-à-vis commerce persists.

Even as South Korean corporations are transferring out of China, this doesn’t need to indicate decoupling or full alignment with Washington. While Seoul clearly has considerations, akin to in provide chain resilience, there may be an understanding between Beijing and Seoul on working to resolve these points bilaterally.

Another issue that creates suspicion in Seoul is the dearth of political certainty within the United States and the rise of financial nationalism and commerce protectionism. Donald Trump’s presidency (2017-2021), and his prioritization of home manufacturing, was symbolic of this altering political atmosphere. President Joe Biden has additional continued this legacy with the passage of the IRA, displaying that the pattern of polarization continues to be intact. With the 2024 U.S. presidential elections approaching, Seoul can be cautious in taking any drastic steps in opposition to Beijing.

However, the query can be how China perceives Seoul’s altering posture. Till now, Beijing has reacted neutrally to Seoul’s rising profile within the area, as China noticed the shift as not directed towards itself. So far, Beijing doesn’t see Seoul as becoming a member of the “anti-China bloc,” however that might change. Yoon additionally acknowledges this pattern, saying in Davos that “cooperation between countries in the realms of security, economy, and advanced technologies has been increasingly regarded as a package deal, giving rise to the trend of bloc-forming among countries.”

Yoon additionally acknowledged that the “boundaries between security, economic, and cutting-edge scientific technologies are blurring,” placing high-tech exporters like South Korea in a bind.

Defense and Security Considerations: Spoiler in China-South Korea Relations? 

Beijing additionally feels uneasy concerning the deployment of U.S. regional missile protection techniques akin to THAAD in South Korea, which undermines China’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. While Beijing has conveyed its considerations on to Seoul up to now, it additionally resorted to using financial coercion to be extra assertive in its method. As the Yoon administration pursues a coverage of strengthening army cooperation inside the alliance, it may trigger frictions with China.

Seoul and Beijing’s contrasting approaches to responding to nuclear threats from Pyongyang is one other level of competition. Earlier, South Korea-U.S. protection cooperation and joint army workouts directed towards North Korea had been one issue that irked Beijing, which noticed these developments as not directly concentrating on China by constructing Seoul’s defensive capabilities. Those considerations had been settled with an settlement on the “Three Nos,” which dedicated South Korea to not deploy extra THAAD batteries, be a part of a U.S. missile protection community, or signal onto a trilateral army alliance with the U.S. and Japan.

Thus, renewed assist in South Korea for the continued deployment of THAAD missiles and requires constructing a nuclear arsenal would additional pressure bilateral relations and can probably affect commerce. Based on previous precedent, safety developments within the Korean Peninsula will overflow into China-South Korea financial relations, and the notion that Seoul seeks to isolate Beijing by limiting exports of important applied sciences will additional gasoline misunderstandings.


Seoul now has to decide on between geography and commerce, which prioritizes Beijing as the principle companion, and protection and safety cooperation, which requires nearer strategic alignment with Washington. Since Seoul normalized its relations with Beijing within the early Nineties, elevated commerce with China and protection relations with the United States didn’t contradict one another. However, in gentle of threats emanating from North Korea and the intensifying Sino-U.S. competitors over superior applied sciences, Seoul is looking for nearer alignment with Washington. That stated, financial issues stay an vital think about Seoul’s strategic calculations whereas deciding its overseas and home coverage engagements, making it far more tough to train strategic autonomy.

Yoon provided a possible resolution to this downside on the WEF, the place he referred to as for “the global economic order’s return to the free trade system based on universal norms.” However, he additionally emphasised a qualifying situation: “We will align and cooperate with mutually trusted countries in full compliance with the universal rules to secure the global supply chain’s stability.” Contradictions in defining “universal norms,” guidelines, and equity will pose a take a look at for China-South Korea relations – and South Korea-U.S. relations for that matter.

Amidst this complexity, Seoul will discover it tough to stability its pursuits going ahead. It stays to be seen whether or not Seoul can keep away from taking part in bloc formation – and if not, how wouldn’t it guarantee its strengthening alliance with Washington within the tech and protection sectors is not going to affect its financial relations with China going ahead.

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