The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway: Indonesia’s Lessons Learned 

It can be an understatement to say that October was a momentous month for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing celebrated the initiative’s tenth anniversary by holding the third Belt and Road Forum; across the similar time, its signature high-speed railway (HSR) in Indonesia turned operational. The launch of “Whoosh,” the Jakarta-Bandung HSR, on October 2 has been touted as a big achievement for Indonesia and level of pleasure for China’s BRI. 

During the Belt and Road Forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo applauded the railway line at their bilateral assembly, claiming that it was successful and accomplished on time. As the primary HSR in Southeast Asia, the undertaking holds great potential for Indonesia. In phrases of logistics, the railway cuts down journey time between the 2 cities from three hours to below one hour and addresses congestion that prices the economic system billions per yr. But maybe much more important are the alternatives that the switch of information and expertise can have for Indonesian trade. 

Opening simply forward of the initiative’s tenth anniversary, the railway has been hailed as one of many BRI’s flagship initiatives. The railway has gained wide-ranging media protection and acclaim, and fairly rightly so. However, it’s vitally vital to not conflate a profitable launch with a profitable undertaking. As discussions ramp up for the extension of the road to achieve Surabaya, which is roughly 700 kilometers away from Jakarta, it’s crucial that classes realized from the Jakarta-Bandung HSR are taken into consideration for future infrastructure initiatives.

While there’s actually no such factor as a “perfect” infrastructure undertaking, the problems that plagued the Jakarta-Bandung HSR stem from a recurring trait in BRI initiatives: a scarcity of pre-project preparation and due diligence. This crucial part is the place undertaking financiers, builders, and authorities officers undertake a variety of assessments and value determinations of the undertaking from monetary sustainability to environmental impacts. When carried out proper, these assessments can present important advantages to builders, officers, and communities alike, together with direct perception into the native environmental and social context, a construction for undertaking monitoring and reporting, and alternatives to develop and implement plans and mechanisms to deal with challenges as they come up. Conversely, with out the due diligence, issues can go unsuitable and may achieve this in a short time. 

Following the choice to show down the Japanese proposal in favor of China’s bid in late September 2015, the Jakarta-Bandung HSR undertaking was awarded to an Indonesian-Chinese state-owned enterprise consortium, PT Kereta Cepta Indonesia-China (PT KCIC), in early October. The rush was on to kick-start building on the undertaking – a lot to its long-term detriment. 

On the identical day the HSR was assigned to PT KCIC, Jokowi signed Presidential Regulation No.107/2015 which sought to speed up the implementation of the railway undertaking. In January 2016, he signed Presidential Regulation No.3/2016, which deemed the HSR a nationwide strategic precedence undertaking and allowed for expediting the issuing of presidency permits. Despite its excessive precedence, nonetheless, the undertaking wasn’t even included within the authorities’s preliminary Master Plan of National Railway. 

Three weeks in a while January 21, 2016, Jokowi attended the undertaking’s ground-breaking ceremony in West Java. Despite the ribbon slicing, the Indonesian authorities had but to challenge the permits to the contractors and the builders to start building, inflicting the undertaking to return to a fast halt. It would take the Indonesian Ministry of Transport an extra two months to course of the development permits for simply the first 5 km of the 142.3km railway. 

Illustrative of the frenzy to push the HSR by means of, crucial components of the pre-project preparation have been undertaken with lightening pace. The feasibility examine, which often takes 18 months was finalized in simply three months, and the environmental influence evaluation (EIA) which ought to take a yr to a yr and a half to finish, was carried out in simply seven days. Independent analysts in Indonesia highlighted that the EIA uncared for to incorporate key elements together with the undertaking’s influence on landslides, geological fault traces, and water catchments. 

All this due diligence and undertaking preparation falling to the wayside was no small matter to the communities that the railway instantly impacted. The lack of a complete, clear, and a community-engaged EIA course of, particularly one which was undertaken with such pace, resulted in communities in proximity to the railway line being left nearly utterly out of the loop on the undertaking’s improvement and impacts. 

Residents of Laksanamekar village in West Bandung have been disregarded of the EIA course of. When blasting started on one of many railway’s tunnels, not solely have been they caught off guard however their properties started to crack and the neighborhood loss entry to artesian water. This similar state of affairs occurred in different residential areas, together with West Java’s Tipar Sari Asih housing advanced, the place tunnel blasting inflicted important harm on properties. Additionally, as a result of rushed and haphazard EIA, adjustments in land use weren’t adequately included within the evaluation, ensuing blocked drainage channels, disrupted waterways, and elevated flooding. 

Land acquisition and clearance proved to be one other important hurdle within the undertaking’s improvement. After the issuance of presidency permits permitting building to start, which was initially slated for August 2016, PT KCIC had but to acquire and clear a majority of the land wanted for the undertaking. By September 2017, the consortium introduced that it had solely cleared 55 p.c of the land wanted for the railway. It would take till roughly mid-2019 – three years after the bottom breaking ceremony occurred – for the land acquisition course of to be finalized. 

As a results of not solely the land acquisition challenges but additionally the impacts of COVID-19 and shoddy undertaking administration, the undertaking rapidly started to see important price overruns. The preliminary price ticket for the railway line was $5.5 billion. That quantity rapidly ballooned within the subsequent years to roughly $7.2 billion. The mounting undertaking prices induced Jokowi in September 2021 to override a earlier 2015 decree that prohibited state funds going to the railway by means of the signing of Presidential Regulation No.93/2021, which paved the way in which for presidency funds for use to finance the railway. 

The uncertainties surrounding funds and the undertaking’s sustainability don’t cease there. The announcement in 2019 that Indonesia would shift its capital from Jakarta to a brand new, however but to be constructed metropolis, Nusantara in East Kalimantan province, sparked additional issues over the railway’s long-term viability. When the preliminary feasibility examine was undertaken in 2017, undertaking builders assumed that every day passenger quantity can be roughly 61,000 and even then it could take 26 years for the undertaking to interrupt even. With the possible relocation of over 1.5 million authorities workers and their households from Jakarta to the brand new capital, PT KCIC adjusted its assumptions, considerably decreasing the every day passenger demand to 31,000 – due to this fact extending the timeline to 40 years to interrupt even. 

Further highlighting the precarious state of its monetary sustainability, the Indonesian and Chinese governments got here to an settlement that they should allocate $64.3 million yearly to simply cowl the railway’s operational and upkeep prices. This is not any small matter particularly because the Indonesian authorities is more and more elevating the prospect of extending the railway line to Surabaya, which is over 700 km away from Jakarta. 

With the Indonesian authorities asserting on November 1 that it’s going to work with China Railway Group, one of many main shareholders of PT KCIC, to undertake a joint examine on the Surabaya extension, it’s crucial – particularly for native communities and stakeholders –that missteps and classes learnt from the Jakarta-Bandung HSR aren’t repeated or misplaced. 

In searching for to supply steering on how finest to undertake pre-project planning and due diligence and as a corollary enhance undertaking outcomes, the Asia Society Policy Institute developed a Belt and Road Initiative Toolkit to help native communities and corporations engaged within the initiative to make sure that initiatives are developed to be inclusive and environmentally and socially sustainable. Available in English, Mandarin, Bahasa Indonesia, Khmer, and Lao, the toolkit incorporates key info on finest practices on conducting EIAs, tips on how to undertake stakeholder engagement all through the lifecycle of the infrastructure undertaking, and what Chinese and worldwide legal guidelines and insurance policies related to the initiatives. 

Source web site: thediplomat.com

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